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Unpacking state-led upgrading: Empirical evidence from the Uzbek 
horticulture value chain governance 
  
  Abstract 
This paper contributes to the endeavour of bringing the Global Value Chain/Global Production 
Network (GVC/GPNs) and the Developmental State (DS) literature closer in the analysis of 
state-led upgrading.  By triangulating primary and secondary data of the Uzbekistan’s 
horticulture value chain (i.e. Fresh Fruits Vegetables - FFVs), it provides a micro-meso analysis 
of how the state, by creating vertical and horizontal linkages, shaped the pace and direction of 
agro-industrial upgrading. Also, it discusses how targeted macroeconomic policies contributed 
to enable such upgrading.  Finally, by bridging these two levels of analysis, it argues for the 
need to consider the state not only as a regulator, a facilitator, a buyer and a producer within 
GVC/GPNs, but as a coordinator of strategic developmental objectives beyond and across the 
GVCs. Drawing upon a strategic-relational approach and by using the concept of 
organisational upgrading, it discusses how the state articulates the institutional context of 
GVC/GPNs through the establishment of financial and political partnerships with international 
actors to avoid predatory competition in the GVC/GPNs; the coordination of inter-sectorial 
spillovers for short and long-term collective learning and capacity building; and the creation of 
linkages to enable multi-dimensional and inter-temporal developmental objectives. 
Coordinated state interventions and a gradual approach to market reforms are proven 
instrumental to ensure the stability and sustainability of the economic transformation. 
Keywords: state; upgrading; governance; industrial policy; trade; agri-business; GVC/GPN 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Despite diverse theoretical perspectives, economic upgrading has been identified as a desirable 
objective upon which developing countries should focus to promote their growth (Lee, 2013; 
Gereffi, 2014; Wade, 2018). Economic upgrading is defined as a shift to higher productive 
value-added activities, as a result of improved access to, and use of, technology, knowledge 
and skills (Barrientos et al. 2011; Selwyn, 2013). Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identified four 
types of economic upgrading: product-related; process-related; functional (skill-related) and 
inter-sectorial. This article, building on the growing debate on the role of the state in 
GVC/GPNs (Gereffi 2015; Alford and Phillips, 2018; Horner, 2017; Behuria, 2019; Horner 
and Alford, 2019), and combining it with the Developmental State (DS) literature (Cramer, 
1999; Chang 2004; Wade, 2003; 2018) expands the understanding of the role of the state vis-
à-vis upgrading in GVCs in three ways.  
First, although agriculture has often been identified as a strategic sector for triggering 
development in low- and middle-income countries (WB, 2007), research on upgrading has been 
focussing mostly on manufacturing (Gibbon, 2001). This paper, through micro-meso evidence, 
shows how inter-sectorial upgrading represents a viable driver of development and how the 
state can create specific spillovers between agriculture and the industrial sector (Kaplinski and 
Morris, 2016).  Second, it strengthens the empirical understanding of the state’s functions 
conceptualised in the GVC/GPNs literature (Gereffi and Mayer, 2006, Mayer and Phillips, 
2017; Horner, 2017), namely a) facilitative (i.e. assisting firms in the market), b) regulatory 
(and distributive combined, i.e. mitigating inequality and negative market externalities), c) 
buyer (i.e. public procurement) and d) producer (i.e. state owned companies), and it links them 
analytically with the ‘developmental’ macroeconomic policies –i.e. innovation, public finance, 
trade and industrial policy - investigated in the more state-centric developmental state (DS) 
literature. It argues that a closer interface between these two parallel debates allows 
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understanding how state governance in GVC/GPNs can be operationalised through public 
policies, and how it can trigger multiple forms of upgrading in (and to and from) agro-industrial 
value chains.  
Third, by expanding the political economy analysis of the state’s functions (Horner, 2017) and 
bridging micro- and macro-level evidence, it introduces the concept of ‘organisational 
upgrading’, defined here as a state-led coordination strategy able to link economic upgrading 
in GVCs with developmental objectives. Organisational upgrading emphasises the unique 
strategic-relational (Jessop, 2008; Smith, 2015) and multi-scalar (Lee, 2013) mandate that the 
state holds to mediate inter-temporal developmental objectives beyond economic upgrading in 
GVCs. 
The article is structured as follows: the next section reviews the literature on the challenges of 
upgrading and the role of the state in the GVC/GPNs governance. Section Three discusses the 
Uzbek agricultural policies and puts forward a micro-meso analysis of state-led agro-industrial 
upgrading. Section Four presents and critically discusses the macroeconomic interventions for 
the Uzbek FFVs value chain upgrading. Section Five highlights the multidimensional outcomes 
of economic upgrading and discusses how organisational upgrading configured socio-
economic objectives in and out the GVCs. Section Six concludes by highlighting that 
coordinated state interventions through a gradual approach to market reforms are crucial to 
ensure the stability and sustainability of the economic transformation processes.   
2. CHALLENGES OF AND POSSIBILITIES FOR STATE-LED UPGRADING 
Although economic upgrading is a significant driver of economic development, various 
constraints affect its success. Upgrading depends firstly on the expansion of technological, 
human and financial capacities to produce added-value commodities (Chang, 2004). Secondly, 
it depends on the ability to enter new GVC/GPNs and survive international competition over 
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price, quality, volume and reliability through the capture of market shares, value, and 
compliance with certification schemes (Gereffi, 2014; Dolan and Humphrey, 2004). Thirdly, 
it depends on how well coordinated is the development (and management) of vertical and 
horizontal spillovers1 (Hirschman, 1958; Wade, 2018). Thus, a centralised agent able to plan 
and organise complex socio-productive dynamics within the chain is crucial, not only to trigger 
upgrading, but also to maintain such process once it is in place.  
The GVC/GPNs literature focused largely on private governance to understand the processes 
and challenges of upgrading in the era of neoliberal globalisation (Gereffi, 2014; Horner, 2017). 
Given the Multinational Corporations (MNCs)’ hegemonic position in the market, the 
GPNs/GVC literature devoted vast attention to the ability of MNCs to maintain control over 
the technological, financial and commercial flows involved in GPNs/GVC through private 
governance (Dicken, 1994; Dolan and Humphrey, 2004; Selwyn, 2013). Similarly to other 
labour-intensive industries, the agro-industrial chain is often characterised by a buyer-driven 
captive governance (Gereffi et al, 2005; Barrientos et al., 2015), where transnational private 
retailers apply strict private quality standards and exploitative sub-contracts with farmers, often 
resulting in little or no horizontal or vertical spillover effects for skills and capability transfers 
in low-income countries (Bair, 2005; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006; Barrientos et al., 2015). 
However, as Bair stated, “closer attention to the larger institutional and structural environments 
in which commodity chains are embedded is needed in order to inform our understanding of 
the social and developmental dynamics of contemporary [capitalistic growth]” (2005:154).  
The DS literature, from a different lens which is centred more on national industrial policy, has 
challenged the axioms of mainstream debates exactly on the central role of the state (as opposed 
 
1 Horizontal spillovers occur between firms in similar or related production. Vertical spillovers occur between 
firms in contractor- supplier relationships. Backward linkages take place when there is flow of information and 
resources between a firm and its suppliers. Forward linkages take place when investment in higher-value 
production is enabled.  
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to private agents) in triggering upgrading. Authors argued that state intervention, not only does 
not lead to efficiency losses, distortions, and poor economic performance (WB, 2007; Schiff 
and Valdes, 1992; Krueger, 1997), but that it is crucial to finance investments, implement 
strategic inter-sectorial policies and spur systemic learning to trigger development (Hirschman 
1954; Chang, 2004; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Rodrik, 2004; Wade, 2003; 2014; Andreoni, 
2019; Mazzucato, 2013).  Indeed, because the ‘laissez-faire’ paradigm failed its mission of 
successful pathway to development (Rodrik, 2004), starting with the Post-Washington 
Consensus, the role of the state regained some legitimacy in the development agenda and more 
attention is now paid to empirically investigate how state policies can trigger economic 
upgrading and developmental outcomes while capturing value from GVC/GPNs. 
Indeed, recent works, many of which appeared in Review of International Political Economy, 
started untangling the multiple state’s functions in GVC/GPNs. Some authors classify these 
functions as facilitative, regulatory and distributive, and examined how neoliberal reforms 
outsourced these governance functions from the state to the market (Gereffi and Mayer, 2006; 
Mayer and Phillips, 2017; Alford and Phillips, 2018). Horner (2017) added to these functions 
those of buyer and producer, noting that the state is actually an active economic agent in the 
GVCs. Behuria (2019) recently integrated these functions with the political settlements 
framework to highlight that domestic politics shaped the upgrading in Rwanda’s coffee value 
chain. Wengle (2018) also shows that in the post-Soviet region, countries like Armenia and 
Russia have pursued state-led developmental strategies in rural and agrarian sectors. These 
important contributions signal the crucial need to further disentangle the multidimensional role 
and context-specificity of public governance in economic upgrading within GVC/GPNs 
(Behuria, 2019; Horner and Alford, 2019).  
Yet, further work is needed to unpack the role of the state also within and beyond these 
functions. Indeed, the state strategically selects, mediates and coordinates local capabilities, 
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financial resources and societal objectives through different non-economic functions on, off 
and between GVCs. Also, private agents cannot be de-contextualised from the social relations, 
including the government, that shape production and exchange with the GPNs (Barrientos et 
al. 2015), nor from the contextual institutional strategies and organisational forms through 
which private and public goods and services get produced, sold, and regulated by the state. The 
concept of ‘organisational upgrading’, namely the state-led continuous (ex-ante, in-itinere and 
ex-post) configuration of coordinated strategies which link economic upgrading with 
developmental objectives, tries to make explicit the relationships among these ontological 
categories in three ways.   
First, it highlights the fact that the state operates through non-market, inter-sectorial, and inter-
temporal mechanisms at the micri-meso-level and beyond the GVC/GPNs (Ponte and Sturgeon, 
2014:17; Andreoni, 2019). Second, it helps understanding how the state governance functions 
play out through context- and time-specific macroeconomic policies which enable economic 
upgrading. Finally, it shows that inter-scalar state-led coordination not only foster a ‘sound’ 
business environment and productive capabilities for the establishment of GVC/GPNs linkages 
(Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014; Gereffi; 2014; Horner, 2017), but also it encompasses societal 
developmental outcomes outside the GVC/GPNs. 
Figure 1 here 
Hence, organisational upgrading is a conceptual tool useful to make explicit and assess whether 
public governance can be an alternative to the private buyer-led governance, but also whether 
it is able to organise a developmental governance which makes domestic agents and firms 
capture value and power within the GVC/GPNs (Gereffi, 2014; Fishwick, 2018; Ponte and 
Sturgeon, 2014) and societal benefits in and outside the GVC/GPNs.  
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The discussion draws on primary and secondary data of the agro-industrial sector gathered 
through fieldwork research undertaken from August 2015 to January 2016. 16 unstructured 
interviews were conducted with key national stakeholders to map the institutional governance 
and policies on upgrading (questionnaire in Appendix). A stratified farmer survey of 120 units 
was conducted in Samarkand, among the aims of which was to assess differentiation in assets, 
commercialisation, and linkages with agro-firms. Samarkand was chosen because, as it is one 
of the country’s most fertile areas, the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) is investing 
enormously in FFVs. The sampling criteria aims to compare and contrast FFVs and non-FFVs, 
namely 30 cotton/ wheat farmers, 30 FFVs farmers and 60 smallholders, and drew on previous 
data collection exercises (Petrick and Djanibekov, 2016). Additionally, participant 
observations and semi-structured interviews were conducted at two firms in the Samarkand 
region, one a major FFVs consortium and the other an agro-processing firm. The aim of these 
was to grasp firm-level business operations, upgrading, and procurement challenges. Archival 
research consisting of publicly available company data, news articles, national data and reports 
helped to map and investigate the organisational and coordination dynamics of the institutions 
involved. Although international organisations suggest treating official national statistical data 
with caution, they have also been used to grasp the main trends.  
Section Three discusses the Uzbek agricultural policies and puts forward a micro-meso analysis 
of agro-industrial upgrading. 
3. THE UZBEK STATE-LED AGRO-INDUSTRIAL UPGRADING 
While Uzbekistan is often described as an authoritarian state (see Lombardozzi, 2018b; 
Djanibekov et al. 2010) it is also one of the few case of moderniser state in the present days. 
Through a model based of 5-year economic planning, the GoU developed a coordinated 
ecosystem of inter-sectorial public investment, subsidies and expansionary fiscal policy. These 
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targeted interventions made Uzbekistan becoming one of world’s fastest growing country of 
next 10-20 years. Moreover, after years of economic and political closure, it has adopted an 
outward-looking strategy, which intensified once the new president Mirziyoyev took office in 
2o16. Therefore, this case study has been selected because, although under-investigated, it 
offers an insightful example of how the state, by proactively interplaying with local and 
international economic interests and powers, shaped GVC/GPNs while mediating domestic 
societal and political objectives.   Over the last decades Uzbekistan registered a steady growth 
in GDP of around 8 per cent (WB, 2015). Although the agricultural sector has declined from 
28 per cent of GDP to 17 per cent in just a decade, similarly to other lower middle-income 
countries, it still employs around 25 per cent of the labour force and nearly 60 per cent of the 
population – 17 million people – still live in rural areas. (Staritz and Reis, 2013; Djanibekov et 
al., 2010). These factors made the GoU consider agriculture as a key driver of economic 
upgrading (Lombardozzi, 2018a), on which implemented a series of strategic policies. 
Agricultural reforms can be separated into three main stages. First, after independence from 
the Soviet Union in 1991, the GoU placed unprocessed cotton for export at the core of 
agricultural production. This strategy allowed the GoU to acquire foreign exchange due to its 
centrally-managed procurement system. Second, in the late 1990s, the GoU undertook an initial 
crop diversification consisting of an increase in winter wheat and a reduction of 1.1 million 
hectares of cotton to increase grain supply (WB, 2015). Third, in the early 2000s, the GoU 
invested in a reconfiguration of agriculture production towards FFVs. This crop conversion 
was incentivised by the problem of water scarcity and low cotton yields (Petrick and 
Djanibekov, 2016) and by Uzbekistan’s comparative advantage in labour-land ratio. As a 
result, until the late 1990s, 70 per cent of FFVs were produced by 4.7 million smallholders. 
Then, starting in 2005, the GoU established 40,000 additional hectares as orchards, and 
converted 240 thousand hectares from cotton and grain into FFVs (USDA, 2014 – Figure 2 
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shows FFVs’ volume increase) allocating 280 thousand hectares more to FFVs than compared 
to 1990s.  Since 2006 the GoU has also established 267 hybrid non-governmental agro-firms 
involved in the processing of FFVs and their distribution on the international market (WB, 
2015). 
Figure 2 here 
 
The GoU has recognised the high developmental potential of FFVs for inter-sectorial 
upgrading, having FFVs a market value between two and four times that of cotton and wheat 
(WB, 2015; CER, 2017b) and being an important input for agro-processing firms. This 
objective was also embedded into the national ‘Programme of Measures to Expand and 
Develop the Food Industry’ for 2012-2015 (FAO, 2014), aimed at improving the conditions 
for inclusive growth in rural areas, enhancing food security and creating productive 
employment with decent wages for the poorest in rural areas (Altenburg, 2011). The GoU plans 
to create jobs in the sector, while contributing to the diversification of the economy and to the 
expansion of exports. Hence, given the intersecting social, political and economic goals 
attached to the FFVs value chain, it provides an insightful lens to explain organisational 
upgrading. Before exploring that in section 5,  I now investigate how, by enabling ‘strategic 
coupling’ between institutional and productive agents at the micro-meso level (Lee et al. 2014) 
the state triggered agro-industrial upgrading through the FFVs value chain. 
3.1 Enabling upgrading through horizontal and vertical linkages: micro-meso evidence   
Intra- and inter-firm linkages do not involve just private agents and require coordinated meso-
level and actions by the government, which act as an inter-sectorial and inter-scalar mediator 
(Lee et al. 2014).  Based on participant observations in two agro-firms in the Samarkand region 
and on semi-structured interviews, I present and discuss the micro-meso level state 
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interventions which triggered the Uzbek agro-industrial upgrading, and by creating backward 
and forward linkages, enabled economic development.   
Okhalik Oltin Boghi Mevasi, a public-private consortium established in 2008 covering 680 ha 
producing FFVs, was created as a result of the state’s multiple roles of facilitator, regulator, 
buyer and producer (Mayer and Phillips, 2017; Horner, 2017). Initially, the state financed 
investment in the intensive gardening of plums, apples and peaches. As a result, the consortium 
acquired high-yield seedlings from Ukraine, Serbia and other European countries. The 
investment in seedlings are subject to slow increasing marginal returns. Indeed, returns on 
investment in the first year of harvest are low, as the trees produce only 4 tonnes of fruit, but it 
increases to 8 tonnes in the second year, 15 tonnes in the third, 20-25 tonnes in the fourth (to 
arrive to a maximum of 40 tonnes). Secondly, through state-subsidised credits, the consortium 
invested in drip irrigation (propylene tubes), which is an expensive water-saving technology. 
Also, contrary to cotton producers who access agro-chemicals from public providers, the 
consortium uses more expensive international brands (e.g. Syngenta and Bayer). Thirdly, the 
need to monitor and manage a more sophisticated production cycle generated a demand for 
high-skill labour such as managers, agronomists and chemists. Fourthly, the GoU facilitated 
the import of machinery for grading and differentiating harvested products from specialised 
companies such as Italy’s Unitec. Thanks to these interventions, according to survey data, 
farmers manage to differentiate and increase their earnings by exporting the best classes of fruit 
at one US dollar per box, whereas they sell the lower classes at a price four times lower to local 
markets or to agro-processing companies to make concentrated juice or jam. Once product, 
process and functions upgrading were put in place, further dynamics of upgrading occurred. 
The new activities of washing, chopping, bagging, packaging and branding (Figure 3- 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004), also called ‘industrialization of freshness’ (Cramer, 2015) led 
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to inter-sectorial upgrading through the deepening of production diversification, which also 
created opportunities for economic development.    
Figure 3 here 
Agromir is a lead firm in the national agro-processing sector which established a plant in 
Samarkand in 2010 to produce fruit juice, concentrates and paste, pickled and canned 
vegetables, and marinated preparations. To begin with, although production follows the 
seasonal availability of raw FFVs, the company’s massive storage capacity allows the finished 
product to be distributed on the market all year round and a stable supply to be maintained on 
supermarket shelves. Investment in machinery amounts to around US$ 40 million, including 
fermentation silos, fruit processing line, sterilisers, fridges, vacuum evaporation plant with an 
aroma collector and pressing machines imported from European companies, including Tetra 
Pak. Furthermore, the company has passed international tests for quality control certification 
in sanitary, hygienic and inventory capacity, which improves GVC/GPNs integration. In 
addition, employers increased from 233 in 2010 to 519 in 2013, reaching over 600 employees 
in 2015. The average wage for unskilled jobs is 30,000 soms per day (around US$ 6) for a 12-
hour shift with a meal provided (24h/7 cycle), which is above the average farmers’ wage. 
Finally, the raw commodities are sourced locally from the Samarkand region, the Fergana 
valley and Surkhandarya. According to interviews with farm managers and local administrators, 
a three-party contract is signed annually between the supplier, the processing company and the 
local government (hokimiat) which coordinates, regulates and acts as a guarantor for farmers 
who receive a fixed price guaranteed. However, the agro-processing companies also operate in 
a closed production cycle through the vertical integration of FFVs production. As a result, the 
amount of FFVs processed by Agromir rose from 21 million tonnes to 31 million tonnes 
between 2010 and 2013, producing 6 million jars of pickles/conserve and 42 million fruit juice 
bricks per year, with revenue reaching 88 billion Uzbekistani soms (US$ 21 million) in 2013 
12 
 
and net profits increasing 10 fold in three years. Exports increased from US$ 2 million to 7 
million between 2010 and 2013. 
The two case-studies show that the creation of state-led consortiums and a publicly-coordinated 
and regulated contracting system along the value-chain facilitated horizontal (i.e. backward-
upstream) and vertical (i.e. forward-downstream) linkages. First, these multidirectional 
interventions triggered more sophisticated processes of inputs transformation and faster forms 
of supply which deepened the social division of labour through new functions and 
competencies, thus creating direct and indirect employment across producers, traders, 
processors and suppliers (Gereffi, 2014; Bair, 2005). This fuelled a demand for new 
professional profiles and specialised labour triggering functional upgrading. Chemists, 
agronomists and engineers, formally trained in local higher education, have the skills to build 
an internationally competitive industry. 
Second, food-processing gave to the food product a longer shelf life and added value to the raw 
commodities, hence also fiscal revenues increased through such product and process upgrading 
(Gereffi, 2015; Cramer and Sender, 2015). It has created market segmentation and product 
diversification along different sectors and value chains. New service agencies dealing with 
marketing, logistics and quality control have been created which provide the laboratory tests 
and certification necessary to trade fresh and processed agricultural products abroad, expanding 
commercial networks while maintaining an arm’s-length market.  
Third, food processing production is endowed with new technologies and know-how. In 
addition to agro-chemicals, Uzbekistan is becoming a major regional producer of farm 
machinery, including combine harvesters, tractors, trailers, ploughs, hay balers, sprayers, 
rotary mowers and cultivators (FAO, 2014). The state-led efforts at expanding productive 
capabilities across new economic segments helps explaining the patterns seen in Figure 4, 
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which shows how agriculture has decreased in relevance as a source of national employment, 
while the absorptive capacities of other sectors have increased.  
Figure 4 here 
Backward linkages, which here are exemplified by the state-led vertical spillovers between 
local FFVs suppliers and contractors (agro-processing firms), have been also crucial for the 
upgrading of the domestic agro-business industry. Those linkages here occurred through public 
interventions which, by organising the provision of technology necessary to produce FFVs, i.e. 
affordable and specialised machinery, tools, fertilisers, high-yield seeds, irrigation systems and 
credit, enhanced the quantity and quality of FFVs supplied by national farmers. Also, ‘triangle’ 
contracts among farmers, local administrators and agro-business companies, coordinated by 
local public administration, were crucial in the upgrading of the agro-industrial chain and its 
integration into GPN. Survey data also shows that FFVs farmers who engage with processing 
companies have on average higher technological endowments (input index i.e. tractors, high-
yield seeds, fertilizers, irrigation) and asset index (household assets such as car, fridge, cows 
etc.) than farmers who produce cotton and wheat and do not engage with agro-processing 
companies.  
Table 1 here 
Based on interviews, it is noted that FFVs farmers prefer to sell to agribusinesses than to local 
bazars because the former offer more stable, although sometime unfavourable, prices and 
contracting arrangements. By the same token, agribusiness managers confirmed that they tend 
to rely on local suppliers to avoid exposure international to price volatility while reducing 
transportation costs and import dependency. Thus, state-led governance in agribusiness can be 
identified as trailblazing, able to incentivise introduction of new technologies along the chain 
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and enable a reliable demand for local farmers, making the whole sector less mobile (i.e., 
‘footloose industry’ Flamm, 1984).   
Hence, empirical evidence suggests that state-led horizontal and vertical linkages have been 
instrumental in widening the scope and scale of upgrading, in facilitating the introduction of 
know-how and technology, enabling inter-sectorial spillovers, and reducing the short-term 
burden of financial barriers to investment. State intervention entailed product, process, 
functional and inter-sectorial upgrading of the FFV industry, while addressing societal goals. 
In the next session I explore in detail why state intervention was crucial for technological 
upgrading.  
3.2 Technological upgrading    
Short-term capital constraints can be an obstacle for the successful integration of local 
production into the GVC/GPNs and the broader development of the economy, therefore the 
state is instrumental to fill such gaps to enable technological upgrading. During interviews, 
policy makers acknowledged that because private capital was scarce, inputs and technology 
such as machinery, new seedling fertilizers and drip irrigation were only accessible with the 
support of (large-scale) public investment (Wade, 2018). In the FFVs value chain, state-owned 
and joint-venture companies acted as risk-bearing businesses, without the pressure of short-
term returns and unfavourable high interest rates to initiate capacity building. As a result of the 
introduction of processing technologies, upgrading mechanisms and linkages to GPNs have 
started.  
Participant observations at the consortium have shown that when harvests are smaller than 
expected, grading machines are not activated and the grading process is executed manually by 
low-wage unskilled labour, typically young women. This is because when the volume of FFVs 
is low, labour becomes cheaper than the cost of the electricity required to operate the machines. 
Relatively high energy costs prevent full-capacity utilisation of the technology in place in the 
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sector, creating inefficiency. This example is crucial to understand the constraints on 
technological upgrading in a developing economy. Indeed, as long as rural wage levels are very 
low, manual labour has a competitive advantage over the implementation of technology. Thus, 
existing firms, being in a position of oligopsony for labour demand, have no incentive to use 
technology systematically. Calculations based on interviews with farmers show that agro-firms 
employ four permanent workers per hectare on average, plus an additional four fruit pickers 
per hectare in the harvest season. Figures show that the overall demand for unskilled and skilled 
wage-labour in the FFV agro-sector, estimated at 300,000 units in 2015, is still scarce and is 
unable to absorb the current active workforce, estimated at 2 million people in the Samarkand 
region, despite the presence of other industries like tourism and services. Interviews with 
farmers confirmed that rural workers would prefer to be employed in the agro-processing 
companies rather than working seasonally in the farms. 
Therefore, empirical evidence shows that the slow pace and cost of upgrading, and the fact that 
supply rarely creates its own demand, can be addressed by public expenditure through the 
creation of complementary sources of demand for technology, especially at the beginning of 
the catching-up process (Chang, 2009). This case study shows that the given factor 
endowments, namely a relative abundance of cheap labour and agricultural land per-capita, 
have been channelled into the transformation of the agro-industrial sector by injecting public 
capital. In fact, given the overwhelming supply of ‘low-cost’ labour alongside capital scarcity 
in rural areas, large-scale interventions have used public finance to invest in capital-intensive 
technology in a context where, similar to many developing countries, the initial costs are too 
high for private domestic investors and too risky for foreigners. Although the use of technology 
is disrupted in the short-run, public interventions enables long-term positive outcomes for both 
employment creation and eventually wage levels. By subsidising the initial demand for 
technology, such short-run inefficiencies will be countered in the long-run, because it is 
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expected that the domestic nodes of the value chain will expand and the relative fixed costs of 
technological inputs over labour will decrease due to the creation of more employment.  
In conclusion, the huge gap between capital and labour costs in low-income countries hinders 
dynamics of upgrading. If the labour price defined by the ‘market’ is too low relative to the 
price of capital, upgrading will not take place automatically because lead firms can still make 
a profit. In this scenario, both human and physical resources will remain underemployed. 
Indeed, an abundance of rural labour and tight wage-labour dependency can imply an 
extremely high rate of return from labour exploitation, dis-incentivising any productivity 
improvement and therefore perpetuating conditions of captive governance and slow economic 
transformation (Bernstein, 2010). Furthermore, local suppliers and nodes of production will 
get stuck in low-quality production with limited virtuous linkages to GPN (Selwyn, 2013). 
Such constraints suggest that introducing technology and innovation is necessary but not 
enough, and complementary state-led capacity-enhancing strategies have to come into play if 
upgrading is to be made effective and sustainable in the long-term. In the next section I will 
discuss which, how and why state macroeconomic policies have co-enabled the vertical and 
horizontal spillovers behind the upgrading of the FFV value chain.  
4. THE MACRO INTERVENTIONS BEHIND THE UZBEK AGRO-INDUSTRIAL 
UPGRADING  
Uzbek FFVs’s upgrading and its integration into the GVC/GPNs did not pass through the 
typical ‘shock-therapy’ based on neoliberal prescriptions – i.e. rapid market deregulation, price 
liberalisation and privatisation - (Chang and Nolan, 1995; Spechler, 2008). That is why it is 
crucial to investigate how strategic macroeconomic policies on innovation, public finance, 
trade and industrial policy have enabled such dynamics of upgrading.  
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4.1 Innovation policy and R&D  
Although there is no automatic linear relationship between R&D and growth (Mazzucato and 
Perez, 2015:45), the GoU subsidised research tailored around strategic sectorial objectives. 
Product upgrading in FFVs occurred through a combination of coordinated macroeconomic 
policies on innovation. The GoU, given its budget and capacity constraints, has integrated 
investment in R&D and ‘leapfrog’ solutions to expand the quantity and quality of local FFVs 
value chain, thus acting as facilitator, buyer and producer of innovation.  First, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources has financed agro-related R&D in Uzbekistan. The GoU has 
created two national Research Institutes, one for vegetables, melons and potatoes and one for 
the plant industry. It has established 161 branches across the country and manages 45 research 
institutes (Musaevich, 2013) which enabled strong innovation linkages with local consortiums. 
Although available data on the amount of public investment in agriculture R&D are outdated, 
Table 2 shows a small but steady increase in funds allocated to research in agriculture. 
Moreover, in 2013 the commitment to R&D increased, with expenditure rising from 0.3 to 0.41 
per cent of GDP (UNESCO, 2015).  
Table 2 here 
Interviews with FAO, UNDP and farmers suggest that, although resources are still insufficient 
for the objectives set for the sector by the GoU, the breeding of new seeds and FFVs varieties 
has nevertheless increased yields and expanded productive capacity. Second, as shown by the 
case of Okhalik consortium, new seedlings have been imported to compensate for the lag in 
local innovation outputs. As result of such crop-diversification, over 160,000 FFV agro-firms 
have been established in the country, which supply both domestic and foreign players with 
higher returns on sale (CER, 2017b). 
Such combined types of innovation have been possible because of the GoU’s political 
commitment to prioritising long-term investment in the value chain rather than focussing on 
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short-term gains (Mazzucato, 2013). This is a unique feature of state governance irreplaceable 
by profit-driven private businesses (Wade, 2018). As noted in the previous section, evidence 
suggests that in a context characterised by low skills and low private capital accumulation, 
technological upgrading is not automatically created, but can be developed through a 
combination of state-led innovation and enhancing-capacity policies (Dosi et al. 1988; Rodrik, 
2004). R&D, emulation and transfers, if promoted by the state (Lall, 1992) and operationalised 
through public institutions, can enable these objectives.  
4.2 Public Finance and Foreign Direct Investments  
Another key aspect useful to understand the role of the Uzbek state in FFVs’ upgrading and 
GPN/GVC governance is to unpack its regulatory role on foreign capital and public finance. 
Through these two combined forms of investment, the GoU captured value from the GVC and 
shaped capital accumulation by retaining solid ownership of prominent firms in FFVs. The 
GoU has invested in the food-processing sector through various creative arrangements, 
including private-public partnerships, joint-ventures and contractual consortiums facilitated by 
tax incentives, restrictions and financial agreements.  
As evidence from other countries suggests, the relation between upgrading and FDIs is 
controversial. FDIs can be detrimental to low income countries’ ability to upgrade. The nature 
of joint-venture contracts can be rigid and biased against the country’s interests, particularly 
when the public objective is to tackle inequality and reach inclusive growth (Van Waeyenberge 
and Bayliss, 2017). To avoid predatory investment, the GoU has shaped the flow and type of 
FDIs through ‘local-content’ conditionalities: companies must have funds of at least 
US$ 150,000 and must earn over 60 per cent of income from the sale of the goods or services 
they produce or provide; the share of foreign investments must be no less than 30 per cent of 
the company’s capital. Furthermore, ad-hoc frameworks are in place to attract FDIs to trigger 
FFVs upgrading specifically: FDIs in agribusiness benefit from targeted tax incentives such as 
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the waiving of customs duties on the import of special ingredients, technological equipment, 
components and spare parts for equipment which are not produced domestically but used in the 
processing of vegetables and grapes 2 . To encourage the timely replacement of obsolete 
equipment, a charge of 0.25 per cent of the equipment’s historical value is collected from legal 
entities (except micro and small enterprises) for the continued use of such equipment, but 
revenue from the sale/disposal of fully-depreciated equipment is exempted from tax. Foreign 
companies producing agricultural products are exempted from asset tax (PwC, 2012) and have 
protection against expropriation (USDA, 2014; Decree № 105 7 April 2011). Furthermore, the 
tax burden on companies has been eased and now corporate tax rate is nine per cent, and a 
performance-based reduction is available if export sales exceed 15 per cent, but at least 50 per 
cent of the income generated must be reinvested in the development of the company (Deloitte, 
2015). As a result, new Greenfield investment appeared in the economy, and this injection of 
foreign capital has permitted the development of processing sites where technology and 
innovation were scarce, enhancing the local technological base. Although interviewees noted 
that both public and private investment are low and are increasing very slowly, these 
investments made Uzbekistan become the fourth transition economy by number of joint-
ventures (WIR, 2016)3. Indeed, since the country’s independence, the FFVs value chain has 
attracted more than 200 joint-ventures involving investors from Europe, Turkey, Russia, 
Switzerland, the USA and South Korea.  FDIs in the agro-processing sector are growing, with 
total investments deployed in the agri-sector amounting to US$ 2.3 billion in 2015 (WIR, 2016). 
The state-led mix of restrictions and incentives facilitated the development of vertical and 
horizontal spillovers to domestic industries, protected national champions in a coordinated the 
industrial strategy (Horner, 2017).   
 
2 Presidential decrees № УП-3860, dated 14.03.2007 and № UP-4354, dated 24.08.2011. 
3 According to the World Investment Report (WIR, 2012), Uzbekistan was ranked 78th/181 by the FDI Inward Attraction Index in 2011, significantly 
improving its 2000 position of 143.  
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Interviews with policy makers suggested also that foreign businesses faced transaction costs 
due to the complicated bureaucracy to repatriate earnings. Such business environment 
discouraged foreign private investment. However, as part of the market-oriented reforms, in 
2017 the currency market was liberalised, allowing citizens and companies to buy foreign 
currency at a market-set rate (UzDaily.com, 2017) which, according to interviewees, simplified 
also the mobility of international capital.  
In addition, farmers in 2015 frequently identified a lack of cheap credit to invest in technology 
or skilled labour as a limitation on upgrading. Yet, recently not only private FDIs but also 
International Financial Institutions such as the IFC-WB group have become increasingly 
involved in financing the Uzbek agro-food industry. Through the Global Trade finance 
program, the portfolio of local commercial banks has been expanded to issue agro-loans to 
agro-firms. Moreover, in 2014 IFC has invested US$ 120 million to support 31 projects in the 
agro-food chain, as well as acting in an advisory role. Although those loans have contributed 
to increase investment in the private sector, the GoU still borrows at a much lower interest rate, 
avoiding the pressures of profit’s short-terminism (Naqvi, 2018).  Indeed in 2013 the state was 
still the major funding source for domestic investments (available data- Figure 5).  
Figure 5 here 
Therefore, in this case study we do not observe a case of a ‘foreign capital-driven sector’ or a 
‘captive’ value-chain  in which foreign firms use their financial power to subordinate local 
suppliers by creating technological, financial and job dependency. Here the state attracts 
foreign capital while regulating the financial system, which is recognised as a necessity to 
escape the middle-income trap (Wade, 2018). Agro-processing firms, while engaging with 
international capital, through state’s support have been able to invest and upgrade, a proposition 
which contradicts the literature that sees FFVs global lead-retailers as the only window for 
upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). The GoU has intervened as a facilitator to attract 
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FDIs, but through regulatory conditionality it retains a ‘golden stake’ in crucial nodes of the 
sector, thus acting also as a producer. Venture capital operates under the government’s 
coverage and warranty for the most uncertain and costly investments (Mazzucato and Perez, 
2015).  
This case-study suggests that, in a situation of financial constraint, governments have a crucial 
role in balancing risks and long-term returns over time and people’s needs. Virtuous forms of 
partnership, if effectively regulated and incentivised by the state, can be beneficial for 
technological transfer and employment creation. The state configured a legislative and 
regulatory framework able to attract and retain FDIs while promoting industrial development 
(Ahrens, 2008; Khan, 2007, Horner, 2017) but also while guaranteeing that local actors 
maintain the power to influence the GVC/GPNs for their own developmental objectives.  
4.3 Trade Policy  
The Uzbek agro-industrial upgrading was supported by a state-led expansion of FFVs domestic 
production, which was facilitated by various trade policies. First of all, the GoU used its role 
of regulator to implement targeted protectionist policies, subsidies and indirect taxation to 
modulate the quality and quantity of import of intermediate and final commodities. Table 3 
shows that different food types’ imports were taxed at different rates depending on whether 
they enter or not into direct competition with strategic local production. While fresh FFVs and 
dairy products are severely taxed, intermediate products such as sugar and oil, which are scarce 
domestically but necessary for the agro-processing sector, are subject to a lower level of 
taxation.  
Table 3 here 
As confirmed by unstructured interviews with ministries, managers and FAO, the state actively 
and selectively protected agri-commodity import to support and favour the upgrading of local 
agro-processing value-chain.  Indeed, protecting domestic infant industries can trigger positive 
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effects for commercial agriculture (Friedman and McMichael, 1989). Furthermore, because the 
quality of FFVs reached a level which is attractive for regional and international markets, that 
created a new source of fiscal revenue for the state budget to support long-term local 
investments and integrate and expand local business within GVC/GPN (Mazzuccato and Perez, 
2015).   
Another way through which the GoU facilitated and regulated the upgrading of the FFVs value 
chain was by arranging bilateral trade agreements and trading blocks. The geography of the 
Uzbek trading network suggests that historical, linguistic and political closeness played a 
crucial role in setting the current strategic commercial linkages. Public governance has 
therefore prioritised geographical and relational proximity in GVC/GPNs to minimise multiple 
transaction costs. The Government has used political partnerships and cultural-linguistic 
affiliations to build regional and bilateral commercial networks with former Soviet countries 
(Gereffi, 2014). For instance, trading with Kazakhstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU), allows Uzbekistan to trade with the entire EEU block free of charge. Moreover, 
the GoU also used the geo-political friction between the EU and Russia and the consequent 
embargo in place since August 2014 (EP, 2015) to strengthen the commercial relationship with 
Russia. In April 2017, Russian and Uzbek representatives signed a bilateral trade agreement 
for FFVs and processed food worth US$ 612 million.  
In its role of facilitator of FFVs’ commercialization, the GoU also developed a national and 
international strategy of rebranding aimed at expanding the export potential of the FFVs value 
chain through a series of marketing operations. The GoU financed stalls at the Expo Milan 
2015, established trading houses and representative offices in Russia and Kazakhstan, and 
plans to open commercial hubs in Europe, India, the UAE, and East Asia. Through a 
presidential resolution on ‘measures to organise and hold an international fruit and vegetable 
fair’, in 2016 the GoU organised an international fair involving ministries of foreign economic 
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relations, investments and trade, agriculture and water management, ‘Uzbekoziqovqatholding’ 
– a foodstuff holding company – and ‘Uzbekoziqovqatzahira’, an association for storing and 
harvesting fruit.  
Hence, the GoU, in its role of regulator, of facilitator and effectively of seller, has organised 
a trade policy built around a combination of selective protectionism, export orientation based 
on regionalism and bilateralism and timely marketing operations, which contributed to the 
strengthening of domestic agro-industrial upgrading and engagement with GPNs while 
bypassing multilateral trade nodes.  
4.4. Industrial policy  
FFVs are ‘time-sensitive’ commodities subject to seasonality, perishability and are scattered in 
remote rural areas, which make their commercialisation difficult. Hence, FFVs need to be 
efficiently stored in cold-chain infrastructures (i.e., backward linkages) to be then 
commercialised towards various market destinations in a timely manner (i.e., forward linkages). 
Despite being fundamental for commercial access, infrastructures and storage facilities were 
considered insufficient by interviewees. Post-harvest losses due to logistical barriers and high 
transport costs have been identified in the tomato and apple supply chains in many districts 
(Hasanov, 2016; CER, 2017b; USDA, 2014). These gaps have contributed to the fluctuation of 
FFVs’ prices and supply. Furthermore, procedures for sanitary and hygiene standards were 
neither standardised nor sufficiently widespread, especially in the most remote areas, creating 
barriers to exporting FFVs.  
However, in 2016 the president founded Uzagroexport, a governmental agency which acts as 
export marketing board and industrial planner as in other latecomer countries (Lee, 2013; 
Mazzucato and Perez, 2015). Uzagroexport has been instrumental in investing in ad-hoc 
infrastructures such as refrigerators, warehouses in harvest areas, storage facilities and sorting 
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and grading machinery. Uzagroexport coordinates the supply of packaging materials with firms, 
deals with logistics and transportation, and provides a quality management and standardisation 
centre, thus acting as a co-producer.  
Uzagroexport also implemented a monopsony system of procurement and a monopolistic 
export system. When the scheme was launched in 2016, producers received 25 per cent of the 
revenue gained from their exports in local currency, because the GoU converted this proportion 
in order to retain hard currency. Interviewees noted that this ‘commission fee’, together with a 
lack of insurance, corresponded to a loss for farmers because of the non-convertibility of the 
Uzbekistani som. However, new president Mirziyoyev suspended this measure in September 
2017 which shows that the implementation of ad-hoc and time-specific policies is possible and 
useful. Indeed, although this measure temporarily increased production costs for FFVs farmers, 
it stabilised both food supply and food prices (CER, 2017b) which contributed not only to the 
stability of the value chain but avoided food shortages and price volatility for consumers. 
State governance have thus played a significant role in expanding access to GVC/GPNs 
through investment, commercial partnerships, regulations and non-market incentives. The GoU 
has helped to transform agri-industrial productive capabilities, expanding infrastructure and 
marketing operations (UNIDO, 2013). These policies boosted local revenue through the 
integration into GVC while fostering product and processes diversification. This case study 
highlights that the state not only has strengthened horizontal and vertical linkages through 
public and private institutions, but it has also linked private actors’ businesses to its own 
developmental objectives. It also confirms that policy makers and academics should go beyond 
the issue of whether or not the state should intervene in the GVC governance and focus instead 




5. ORGANISATIONAL UPGRADING  
In this section, using a strategic-relational approach and the concept of organizational 
upgrading, I will discuss the links between state-led upgrading and development outcomes.  
5.1. The recent outcomes of Uzbek state-led agro-industrial upgrading  
Data show that, through such multi-directional and multi-scalar interventions, Uzbekistan has 
become one of the main producer of FFVs in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
region.  In 2016 Uzbekistan produced more than 9 million tonnes of FFVs, and around 800 
thousand tonnes, or around 7 per cent of total output, were exported. The volume of FFVs 
exports expanded exponentially over recent years, replacing traditional export commodities 
(WB, 2015-Figure 6). In 2015 the value of FFVs exports amounted to US$ 492 million and it 
reached US$ 708.8 million in 2017. The GoU’s objective is to export 2 million tonnes of FFVs 
annually by 2020 (Uzagroexport, 2017; FAO, 2014) 
Figure 6 here 
Also the export destinations expanded, including Azerbaijan (46 per cent), Kazakhstan (37 per 
cent), Ukraine (7 per cent), Russia (4 per cent) and the USA (2 per cent) (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 here 
Exports of processed FVs are smaller in volume than those of unprocessed FFVs, which form 
75 per cent of Uzbekistan’s agro exports. Exports of processed food and nuts from Uzbekistan 
amount to US$ 254 million (CER, 2017a) and face steady growth as a result of such continuous 
public investment. The main destinations are regional markets, with 46 per cent going to 
Azerbaijan and much of the rest going to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, 
although Eastern Europe and China are becoming increasingly important destinations (Figure 
8).  
Figure 8 here 
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Such results have been possible due to a multi-scalar state-led strategy, which enabled multiple 
upgrading of the Uzbek horticulture value chain and beyond. The GoU has acted as a 
coordinator of vertical and horizontal spillovers along the FFVs value chain, across and within 
sectors and towards the GPNs while maintaining a productive system based on an arm’s length 
market. The value of production in the overall agricultural sector – Figure 9 – has increased as 
result of the expansion of livestock and FFVs production, as well as of employment and of 
income.  
Figure 9 here 
The underpinning state-led institutional reconfiguration through which inter-sectorial and 
spatiotemporal developmental objectives were coordinated, and resources and information 
transmitted,  is here described as ‘organisational upgrading’. Organisational upgrading did not 
affect only the GVC/GPNs, but enabled the development underway.  
 
5.2 Organizational upgrading and the political-economy of development  
 
The GoU realised organizational upgrading by intervening in and out the GVC/GPNs while 
coordinating developmental objectives. In order to untangle organizational upgrading, a first 
point to expand is about the ‘developmental’ implications of a state which is buying and 
producing. A criticism being raised within the literature on the Uzbek economy, but also on 
other developing countries, is that the GOU, by maintaining control of the FFVs’ production 
and distribution through a parastatal agency, distorts market signals, creates rent-seeking and 
efficiency-losses while hampering market competition and local investment (Ergashev, 2015; 
Petrick and Djanibekov, 2016). Similarly to other developing economies, deregulation, 
privatisation and market liberalisation have been depicted by the WB and IMF as the best 
policy solutions for triggering upgrading dynamics in Uzbek agriculture (WB, 2015, IMF, 
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2008). However, as the DS literature points out, even if rent is produced through public 
institutions such as Uzagroexport, it is retained and re-circulated within the national economy 
(Khan, 2007; Chang, 2009). Indeed, in cases of market liberalisation, profits have often been 
co-opted by foreign traders and MNCs, meaning that revenue is expatriated without any 
multiplier or spillover effects being created in the local economy. Indeed, empirical evidence 
in other developing countries shows that in the early 1990s, once cash-crop exporting countries 
had dismantled their marketing boards and liberalised their markets, the value deriving from 
the reduction of post-farm costs were not appropriated by farmers, but rather by consuming 
countries (Kaplinsky, 2004:12). As a result, sub-contractual terms worsened and small 
producers were unable to escape the low rank positions assigned to them by the buyer-driven 
GVC governance, producing with low input intensity and inefficiency and thus halting the 
dynamics of upgrading and inter-sectorial growth. As this case study shows, the creation of 
local linkages and spillovers not only provides economic incentives such as profit 
maximisation, but also supports political and social goals such as creating employment in rural 
areas, boosting wages, and guaranteeing a stable income for farmers, which are explicit 
political objectives of the GoU. Yet, it has to be recognised that this process of productive 
transformation is not a win-win overall and it has undesired distributional implications. 
Smallholders are currently squeezed in the middle of this transition on two fronts: first, and as 
mentioned above, because the capacity of labour absorption of the processing sector and 
become wage labour is still low and second of all, because those who are not producing at the 
scale or capacity necessary, are excluded by this more profitable circuits linked to international 
markets. Nonetheless, if small suppliers are exposed to unregulated markets, the related risks 
will be individualised by the farmers themselves. This scenario will not create a driver for long-
term sustainable and inclusive growth and predatory governance will outflow the value created 
by the GVC/GPNs outside the country.  Instead, a coordinated state-led strategy based on 
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continuous multi-scalar support, time-sensitive incentives and institutional reforms, including 
public procurement and provision, can enable not only economic upgrading but incremental 
social and economic change at scale.  
A second point to highlight is about the desirable multiplier effects that the state triggered by 
acting as a strategic regulator, a facilitator and a seller in the market.  In a global trade 
dominated by WTO rules, it is often believed that trade liberalisation would stimulate the 
integration of domestic suppliers in the labour-intensive GVC/GPNs, enabling the transfer of 
technology and know-how (Cramer, 1999). In countries with abundant supply of unskilled 
workers and land per capita, World Bank agri-chain policies focus on strengthening the links 
between local small-holder farmers and the lead-firms of the GVC/GPNs (Webber et al., 2010). 
Free market and supply-side policies based on quality and productivity enhancement alone are 
believed to be conducive to development and upgrading (Krueger, 1997; Lin and Chang, 2009).   
However, these propositions have been widely criticised in the DS literature and disproved in 
this case study. Firstly, they overlook and/or overrate the economic and financial capacity of 
the local private governance, which limits both the upgrading of the agro-industry and the 
creation of local demand in the market. Secondly, they overestimate the developmental 
potential of joining the GPNs through small-scale farming. Productivity enhancement remains 
the main driver of capitalistic growth, and small-scale suppliers are often disadvantaged, 
especially in commodity production, where initial costs are high and increasing marginal 
returns are slow, thus creating a barrier to entry (Mazzucato and Perez, 2015; Lee 2013). In 
fact, structural obstacles linked to the creation of economies of scale, technological upgrading, 
viable commercial channels and capacity building have been overlooked, as have the structural 
power asymmetries between local farmers and MNCs (Bernstein, 2010; Selwyn, 2013). Hence, 
upgrading seems unlikely to be driven by market liberalisation, deregulation and small scale 
businesses (Horner, 2017). Successful socio-economic transformations were historically based 
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on uneven and discriminatory state-policies, often relying on subsidies, credit and price 
stabilisation schemes in agriculture (Chang, 2009; Bernstein and Oya, 2014), as this case study 
suggests. Indeed, protective tariffs were widely used by western economies in the 20th century 
to facilitate the commercialisation of domestic agriculture (Friedman and McMichael, 1989). 
Thus, although protectionism and import substitution policies have been criticised for creating 
corruption and bureaucratic rent-seeking and for hampering the expansion of the private sector 
(Krueger, 1997), evidence suggests that selected protectionist trade policy and industrial 
policies could be essential to enable developmental upgrading (Rodrik, 2004). Short-term 
distortions can determine a long-term increase in productivity, which allows spillovers between 
domestic suppliers and global capital markets. The state can put in place regulation to shape 
domestic comparative advantage and add value to traded commodities.  In this case, the GoU, 
while creating inter-sectorial upgrading, has also facilitated new commercial partnerships. It 
has negotiated economic agreements by establishing ties between nation states. It has supported 
the establishment of large and stable commercial contracts for FFVs farmers, providing them 
with a stable income. It has exploited economies of scale in order to acquire machinery, source 
reliable and affordable inputs, train and employ rural labour, and access credit and information. 
These multidimensional achievements enhanced the position of the Uzbek industry in the 
GVCs but also developed societal benefits.  
All these state’s functions were strategically coordinated with one another and linked with 
inter-temporal societal and political objectives which lie outside the GVC (Jessop, 2008; Chang, 
2009). In particular, the GoU, by supporting national food production, by mediating the flow 
of food exports and subsidising inputs, and by using protectionist policies, has avoided 
fluctuations of food supply in the domestic market and in particular risks of food shortages 
which served the objective of food security (Lombardozzi, 2018b) and indeed Uzbekistan is 
one of the few countries which halved hunger by 2015, as targeted by the Millennium 
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Development Goals. Another example of how the GoU linked upgrading to societal and 
ecological objectives is the state-led conversion of land from cotton to FFVs. Indeed, FFVs are 
less water-intensive crops compared to cotton but also much more labour-intensive, so they 
were crucial to boost employment in rural areas and preserve natural resources. Only the state 
has the capacity to identify and address such societal needs by planning timely and inter-scalar 
strategies of such scale and scope. In other words, the state sits in a unique position to mobilize 
and transfer resources and assets which could have not be deployed by private governance.   
Evidence suggests that organisational upgrading is needed to arrange complex shifts in 
production capabilities which require large investments in the acquisition of technology, 
innovation and know-how. The government has identified strategic and potentially interlinked 
value chains, has invested in them, planned and created incentives which purposively provided 
initial rent to incentivise productive and learning opportunities for infant firms (Lee, 2013; 
Horner, 2017). It has shaped and coordinated market and non-market institutions in their early 
stages of development which enabled social and economic transformation (Bair, 2005). 
Through state ownership and public procurement the GoU was able to stimulate domestic 
production and its integration into GVC/GPNs while allowing technology to be accessed and 
diffused. Such state-led institutional reconfiguration has shaped the nodes and power of 
commodity chain (Dicken, 1994; Talbot, 2002; Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014) but at the same time 
served distributional outcomes for firms and workers (UNCTAD, 2016), created jobs and 
increased incomes and fiscal revenues. The state through organizational upgrading responded 
to various needs and pursued multiple strategic developmental objectives.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article used the Uzbek FFVs value chain to shed light on how state-led coordination 
strategies cross sectors, institutions, time and scales, shaped inter-sectorial economic upgrading 
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at the micro level and triggered the developmental change underway. This case suggests that 
organisational upgrading was essential for the redefinition of the production structure and 
employment regimes in the long-run (Gereffi, 2014; Fine and Dimakou, 2016), as well as for 
overcoming the boundaries of the agriculture-industry-service complex, driving pro-poor 
growth through strategic horizontal and vertical linkages in the domestic economy and within 
GVC/GPNs through inter-sectorial upgrading.  
The article has also bridged the micro-meso level analyses of upgrading with macro-level 
discussions on the role of the state in GVCs. In particular, looking at the multiple state’s 
functions of buyer, regulator, facilitator and producer, it has shown that the GoU has managed 
to attract FDIs and avoided instances of captive governance and predatory sub-contracting. 
Macroeconomic policies provided the institutional space to build local capabilities at the micro-
level. Trade policies and selected protectionism have been crucial for technology transfer and 
for the creation of new market channels. The challenge is now to phase out tariffs while 
capturing value and market share in the GVC/GPNs.  
In conclusion, this case study has shown that, in contradiction with neoliberal diagnosis, 
gradual state-led institutional and regulatory reforms, by securing stable food prices, inputs and 
income, have been able to minimise the negative impacts on the weakest nodes of the local 
value chain during processed of GVC/GPNs’ integration (Chang and Nolan, 1995). By the 
same token, despite rent–seeking and rather authoritative public governance, gradual and 
targeted liberalisation has allowed the implementation of stable, large-scale economic 
investments to trigger upgrading in local value-chains (Stark and Ahrens, 2012) and the 
acquisition of foreign exchange to finance upgrading processes. Therefore, it is argued that a 
solid state-led coordination of market and non-market institutions and agents – organisational 
upgrading- is fundamental for the creation of coherent and inclusive developmental linkages 







Ahrens J., (2008) ‘Transition towards a Social Market Economy? Limits and Opportunities’ 
Diskurs 2008 – 5  
Alford, M., & Phillips, N. (2018). The political economy of state governance in global 
production networks: change, crisis and contestation in the South African fruit sector. Review 
of International Political Economy, 25(1), 98-121. 
Altenburg T, (2011). Industrial policy in developing countries: Overview and lessons from 
seven country cases. DIE Discussion Paper No. 4/2011. German Development Institute. 
Andreoni, A. (2019) 'A Generalised Linkage Approach to Local Production Systems 
Development in the Era of Global Value Chains, with special reference to Africa'. In: 
Kanbur, R. and Noman, A. and Stiglitz, J., (eds.), The Quality of Growth in Africa. New 
York, USA: Columbia University Press 
Bair, J. (2005), Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward’, 
COMPETITION & CHANGE, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2005 153–180;  
Barrientos S, Gereffi G and Rossi A , (2011) Economic and social upgrading in global 




Barrientos, S., Knorringa, P., Evers, B., Visser, M., & Opondo, M. (2015). Shifting regional 
dynamics of global value chains: Implications for economic and social upgrading in African 
horticulture. Environment and Planning A, 48(7), 1266-1283. 
Behuria, P. (2019). The Domestic Political Economy of Upgrading in Global Value Chains: 
How politics shapes pathways for upgrading in Rwanda’s coffee sector. Review of 
International Political Economy. 
 
Bernstein, H. (2010). Class Dynamics of Agrarian. Change. Halifax 
Bernstein, H., and C. Oya. (2014), Rural futures: How much should markets rule? 
http://www.iied.org/ seven-papers-unpick-debates-african-agriculture-rural-development. 
 
CER (2017a) ‘Structural transformation in Uzbekistan Longer-term challenges for 
modernization’ available at http://www.cer.uz/upload/iblock/f24/oneper cent20pages_10.pdf   
Center for Economic Research – UNDP (2017b) “Improving Productive and Export Potential 
of Fruit and Vegetable sector of Uzbekistan: Challenges and Perspectives” available at 
http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/library/poverty/improving-productive-
and-export-potential-of-fruit-and-vegetable.html   
Chang, H-J. (2004) Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of the State. London: 
Zed Books. 
Chang, H. J., (2009). ‘Rethinking public policy in agriculture: lessons from history, distant 
and recent’. Journal of Peasant Studies, 36 (3), 477-515 
34 
 
Chang, H. J., & Nolan, P. (1995). Europe versus Asia: Contrasting paths to the reform of 
centrally planned systems of political economy. In The transformation of the communist 
economies (pp. 3-45). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
CIS (n.a) legislation available at https://cis-
legislation.com/docs_list.fwx?countryid=011&page=2 
Cramer, C., (1999), 'Can Africa Industrialize by Processing Primary Commodities? The Case 
of Mozambican Cashew Nuts', World Development, 27 (7), 1247-66 
Cramer, C. and Sender, J. (2015). Agro-processing, wage employment and export revenue: 
Opportunities for strategic intervention. TIPS Working paper for the Department of Trade and 
Industry; 
Cramer, C. (2015, December 4) [Blog post]. Retrieved from 
https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/development-studies/2015/12/04/high-tech-oranges-and-big-pharma-
blueberries-industrialising-freshness-in-global-agriculture/comment-page-1/ ; 
Deloitte, (2015) Tax and Investment Guide Uzbekistan - Deloitte available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/kz/Documents/uzbekistan/uz_tax_investmen
t_guide_2015.pdf 
Dicken, P. (1994). Global‐local tensions: Firms and states in the global space‐economy. 
Economic Geography, 70(2), 101–128. 
Djanibekov, N., J.P.A. Lamers and I. Bobojonov, (2010), “Land Consolidation for Increasing 
Cotton Production in Uzbekistan: Also Adequate for Triggering Rural Development?” In 
Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, eds K. Labar, M. 
Petrick and G. Buchenrieder, 140–9. Halle: IAMO; 
35 
 
Dolan C. and Humphrey, J. (2004), ‘Changing Governance Patterns in the Trade in Fresh 
Vegetables between Africa and the United Kingdom', Environment and Planning A 36.3: 
491-509;  
Dosi G., Freeman C., Nelson R.R., Silverberg G. and Soete L. (eds.). (1988), Technical 
Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter; 
Ergashev A., (2015). How to catch ‘low-hanging’ fruit and vegetables in Uzbekistan: 
Analysis of fruit and vegetable supply. Conference paper  
European Parliament Briefing, October, (2015) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020
_EN.pdf 
FAO, (2014) ‘Eastern Europe and. central Asia agro- industry development’. Country brief: 
Uzbekistan  
Flamm, K. (1984). The volatility of offshore investment. Journal of Development Economics, 
16(3), 231-248. 
Fine, B., (2002), The World of Consumption. The Material and Cultural Revisited, London: 
Routledge.  
Fine, B., & Dimakou, O. (2016). Macroeconomics: A critical companion. 
Fine, B. and Van Waeyenberge, E. (2013) 'A Paradigm Shift that Never Was: Justin Lin’s 
New Structural Economics.' Competition and Change, 17 (4). pp. 355-71. 
Fishwick, A. (2018). Labour Control and Developmental State Theory: A New Perspective 
on Import‐substitution Industrialization in Latin America. Development and Change. 
36 
 
Friedmann, H. and P. McMichael. (1989) “Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and 
Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present.” Sociologica Ruralis 29(2): 93-117. 
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005) ‘The Governance of Global Value 
Chains’, Review of International Political Economy, 12(1): 78–104.  
Gereffi, G. (2013). A global value chain perspective on industrial policy and development in 
emerging markets. Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., 24, 433. 
Gereffi, G., (2014), 'Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world', Review of 
International Political Economy, 21 (1), 9-37. 
Gereffi, G. (2015). “Global Value Chains, Development and Emerging Economies,” 
UNUMEREIT Working Paper # 2015-47. Vienna: UNIDO. 
Gibbon P. (2001) ‘Upgrading Primary Production: A Global Commodity Chain Approach’, 
in World Development Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 345-363. 
Guadagni, M., Martin Raiser, Crole-Rees A., Khidirov D. (2005). “Cotton Taxation in 
Uzbekistan”, The World Bank, ECSSD Working Paper No 41. 
http://r0.unctad.org/infocomm/anglais/cotton/Doc/Uzbek_TAX.pdf 
Hasanov, S. (2016), ‘Agricultural Polices To Enhance The Development Of Fruit And 
Vegetable Subsectors In Uzbekistan’, European Scientific Journal May 2016 edition vol.12, 
No.13 
Hausmann, R., & Rodrik, D. (2003). Economic development as self-discovery. Journal of 
development Economics, 72(2), 603-633. 




Hopewell K. (2016) ‘The accidental agro-power: constructing comparative 
advantage in Brazil’, New Political Economy, 21:6, 536-554, DOI: 
10.1080/13563467.2016.1161014  
Horner, R. (2017) ‘Beyond facilitator? State roles in global value chains and global 
production networks’. Geography Compass; 11:e12307. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12307 
Horner, R. & Alford, M., Jan (2019), Manchester, p. 1-26, 26 p. (Global Development 
Institute Working Paper Series; no. 2019-036). 
Humphrey J. and Schmitz, H. (2004) 'Governance in Global Value Chains', in H. Schmitz 
(ed.) Local Enterprises in the Global Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 95-109 
Humphrey, J. and O. Memedovic. (2006). “Global Value Chain in the Agri-food Sector,” 
UNIDO, Vienna, http://www.unido.org/doc/60033. 
Jessop B (2008) State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
IFC (2015) available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c88c2f0046018d13a31fbb9916182e35/UZ+Factsheet_
FY15.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
IMF (2008) Poverty Reduction strategy paper for Uzbekistan available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0834.pdf 
Kaplinsky R., (2004) Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee and Cocoa Value Chains 
(Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, Brighton, UK) 
Khan, M. H. (2007). Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s, in 
Ocampo, José Antonio, K.S. Jomo and Rob Vos (eds) Growth Divergences: Explaining 
Differences in Economic Performance, Hyderabad, London and Penang: Orient Longman, 
38 
 
Zed Books and Third World Network. Available HTTP: 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp54_2007.pdf  
Khan, M. (2008) 'Investment and Technology Policies.' In: National Development Strategies: 
Policy Notes. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, pp. 
157-197 
Krueger, A. O. (1997). Trade policy and economic development: how we learn (No. w5896). 
National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Lall, S. (1992). Technological capabilities and industrialization. World development, 20(2), 
165-186. 
Lee, K. (2013). How can Korea be a role model for catch-up development? A ‘capability-
based’view. Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing 
World, 25. 
Lee, Y.‐S., Heo, I., & Kim, H. (2014). The role of the state as an inter‐scalar mediator in 
globalizing liquid crystal display industry development in South Korea. Review of 
International Political Economy, 22(1), 102–129. 
Lin, J. and Chang, H.-J. (2009), ‘Should Industrial Policy in Developing Countries Conform 
to Comparative Advantage or Defy it? A Debate Between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon Chang’, 
Development Policy Review, 27 (5), pp. 483–502. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2009.00456.x 
Lombardozzi L., (2018a), ‘Can distortions in agriculture support structural transformation? 
The case of Uzbekistan’, Post-Communist Economies, DOI: 
10.1080/14631377.2018.1458486 
Lombardozzi, L. (2018b), “The nexus between the role of the state, market transition and 
39 
 
food consumption: The case of Samarkand, Uzbekistan” (Doctoral dissertation) SOAS, 
University of London, UK.  
Mayer, F. W., & Phillips, N. (2017). Outsourcing governance: states and the politics of a 
‘global value chain world’. New Political Economy, 22(2), 134-152. 
Mazzucato, M (2013), “The entrepreneurial state. Debunking Public vs. Private Sector 
Myths” Anthem Press  
Mazzucato, M. and Perez, C. (2015), Innovation as Growth Policy, in "The Triple Challenge: 
Europe in a New Age", J. Fagerberg, S. Laestadius, and B. Martin (eds.), Oxford University 
Press: Oxford ISBN 9780198747413 
Musaevich, B. (2013).Agricultural research for development: Investing in Uzbekistan’s 
future. Agricultural Sciences, 4, 62-65. doi: 10.4236/as.2013.42010. 
Naqvi, N. (2018). Finance and industrial policy in unsuccessful developmental states: the 
case of Pakistan. Development and Change. 
Petrick, M. & Djanibekov, N. (2016). "Obstacles to crop diversification and cotton harvest 
mechanisation: Farm survey evidence from two contrasting districts in Uzbekistan, IAMO 
Discussion Papers 153, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition 
Economies (IAMO). 
Ponte, S., & Sturgeon, T. (2014). Explaining governance in global value chains: A modular 
theory-building effort. Review of International Political Economy, 21(1), 195-223. 




Rodrik, Dani, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century (November 2004). KSG 
Working Paper No. RWP04-047. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617544 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.617544 
Schiff, M.; Valdes, A.; (1992). The political economy of agricultural pricing policy : volume 
4 - a synthesis of the economics in developing countries (English). A World Bank 
comparative study. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Schumpeter JA. (1934), ‘The theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle’. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Selwyn, B. (2013). The global retail revolution, fruiticulture and economic development in 
north-east Brazil. Review of International Political Economy, 20(1), 153-179. 
Smith, A. (2015). The state, institutional frameworks and the dynamics of capital in global 
production networks. Progress in Human Geography, 39(3), 290–315. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513518292 
Spechler M., (2008), “The Political Economy of Reform in Central Asia: Uzbekistan under 
Authoritarianism”, London, Routledge; 
Stark, M.; Ahrens, J., (2012): Economic reform and institutional change in Central Asia: 
Towards a new model of the developmental state?, PFH Forschungspapiere/Research Papers, 
PFH Private Hochschule Göttingen, No. 2012/05 
Staritz, C., & Reis, J. G., (2013). Global value chains, economic upgrading, and gender: Case 
studies of the horticulture, tourism, and call center industries. 
41 
 
Talbot, J., (2002), “Tropical commodity chains, forward integration strategies and 
international inequality: coffee, cocoa and tea”, Review of International Political Economy, 
9:4 November 2002, pp 701-734 
The State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Uzbekistan [Goskomstat]. (2012). 
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Tashkent  
Trade Map (2017)  http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx  
Wengle, S. A. (2018). Local effects of the new land rush: How capital inflows transformed 
rural Russia. Governance, 31(2), 259-277. 
Wade, R. H. (2003). What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The World 
Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space’. Review of international 
political economy, 10(4), 621-644. 
Wade, R. H. (2014). ‘Market Versus State’or ‘Market with State’: How to Impart Directional 
Thrust. Development and Change, 45(4), 777-798. 
Wade, R. H. (2018). The developmental state: dead or alive?. Development and 
Change, 49(2), 518-546.   
Webber, C. Martin; Labaste, P. (2010), ‘Building Competitiveness in Africa's Agriculture: A 
Guide to Value Chain Concepts and Applications’. The World Bank 
World Bank (2007) ‘World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development’ 
Washington, C.World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5990  
World Bank (2015) ‘Uzbekistan Strengthening the Horticulture Value Chain” Uzbekistan 





World Investment Report (2016) - Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges 
(UNCTAD/WIR/2016) 
World Investment Report (2012) - Towards a New Generation of Investment 
policies (UNCTAD/WIR/2012) 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2009), Agro-Value Chain Analysis and 
Development, UNIDO, Vienna.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2013), Global Value Chains and 
Development: Investment and Value Added Trade in the Global Economy, Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2016), Structural Transformation 
and Industrial Policy.  
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO Science 
Report.(2016) Towards 2030 2015 available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002354/235406e.pdf 
USDA GAIN Report – (2014) October ‘Uzbekistan Exporter Guide’ 
UZagroexport report (2017) available at http://uzagroexport.uz/en/  
Uzdaily (3 September, 2017) President of Uzbekistan signs decree on liberalization of 




Van Waeyenberge, E., and Bayliss, K. (2017) 'Unpacking the Public Private Partnership 
Revival.' Journal of Development Studies.  
 
